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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
The government asks us to review the district court's 
order granting Tony Jake a new trial after a jury convicted 
him of conspiracy to obstruct justice by bribery. The 
district court awarded a new trial because of a perceived 
error in jury instructions regarding the statute of 
limitations. For the reasons that follow, we will reverse and 
remand for sentencing.1 
 
I. 
 
On January 28, 1999, Tony Jake was indicted on one 
count of murder (Count I), and one count of conspiracy to 
obstruct a criminal investigation by bribery in violation of 
18 U.S.C. SS 2, and 1111(a) (Count II). The indictment 
resulted from the stabbing death of Santos Rosario, Jake's 
fellow inmate at the United States Penitentiary at 
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. The indictment alleged that Jake 
had been involved in the murder of Rosario and that Jake 
thereafter paid another inmate to admit to the crime in 
order to conceal Jake's involvement. 
 
Jake and Rosario had been involved in smuggling drugs 
into the Lewisburg penitentiary since at least the summer 
of 1991. However, sometime after they began bringing 
drugs into the institution, Jake began suspecting that 
Rosario was "skimming" some of the drugs for himself. 
Consequently, Jake blamed Rosario when several drug 
shipments were smaller than Jake expected them to be. 
Things apparently reached a climax a few days before 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3731. 
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Rosario was killed. Jake was expecting a shipment of drugs 
that he never received, and he blamed Rosario for its 
disappearance. However, unbeknownst to Jake, that 
shipment had actually been intercepted and turned over to 
law enforcement authorities. 
 
Tape recordings of Jake's conversations on a prison 
telephone on October 8, 1991 (the day of Rosario's murder), 
revealed Jake's displeasure over the missing shipment. His 
comments clearly showed that he blamed Rosario and 
suggested that he (Jake) was going to do something about 
it shortly after the telephone call. App. at 1578 ("[M]y next 
. . . move is like funky, baby"); App. at 1607 ("[I]n 30 
minutes, it's handled."). 
 
Rosario was stabbed to death by a homemade knife (a 
"shank") a few minutes after that conversation. A 
corrections officer saw Jake hastily leave the area of the 
stabbing shortly after Rosario was stabbed. Approximately 
45 seconds later, another inmate reported that Rosario was 
dying inside the block. Jake was strip searched because of 
his proximity to the area, and prison officials noticed a 
fresh wound on his right leg. 
 
Two days later, a prison official found clothing and a 
shank under a window in the gymnasium bathroom where 
Jake had gone immediately after the stabbing. The pants 
and shirt were splattered with small amounts of blood, and 
subsequent DNA testing disclosed that the blood was 
Rosario's. In addition, the pants that were recovered had a 
cut on the right leg which corresponded to the wound on 
Jake's leg. 
 
Based on this and other evidence, officials began an 
investigation into Jake's involvement with Rosario's death. 
During the investigation, Jake was detained in the 
administrative detention unit of the penitentiary. While 
there, he had conversations with George Allred, an inmate 
who was assigned to the unit as an orderly. According to 
Allred's trial testimony, he and Jake agreed that Allred 
would write an affidavit admitting to the Rosario murder in 
order to insulate Jake from the investigation. In exchange 
for this false confession, Jake was to pay Allred $10,000.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Allred was serving a 75 year prison sentence and had no hope of ever 
leaving prison anyway. 
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Pursuant to that agreement, Jake arranged to have his 
sister and a friend named Deldon Echols wire money to 
Naomi Yarboski, a friend of Allred's. Jake made several 
payments pursuant to this arrangement during the early 
1990s. 
 
The government alleged this conspiracy to obstruct a 
criminal investigation in Count II of the indictment. Both 
sides agree that the applicable statute of limitations for that 
offense is five years.3 However, most of the overt acts 
alleged indicate that the conspiracy occurred between 1991 
and 1995. Only one of the alleged overt acts occurred 
within five years of January 28, 1999, the date of the 
indictment. That was a telephone conversation between 
Jake and Echols. The conversation occurred after Echols 
received a subpoena to appear before the grand jury 
investigating Rosario's murder. During that conversation, 
Jake told Echols to tell the grand jury that the money that 
he had caused to be sent to her for Allred was really to pay 
for pornographic magazines. The money had actually 
constituted Allred's payments for taking responsibility for 
stabbing Rosario. 
 
Jake testified at trial and admitted to having those 
conversations. He also testified that he knew that the 
money was not actually for pornographic magazines when 
he told Echols to testify to that effect before the grand jury. 
He did not, however, admit that the money was a bribe. 
Rather, he testified that the payments were his way of 
rewarding Allred for coming forward and truthfully 
accepting responsibility for admitting that he (Allred) had 
actually been the one who murdered Rosario. App. at 1005- 
14 to 1005-21. At no time during the trial did Jake or 
anyone else dispute the date of the conversation with 
Echols. 
 
At the conclusion of the trial, the prosecutor and defense 
attorney consented to the district court instructing the jury 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. "In order to prove a conspiracy to obstruct justice, the government 
must establish that there was an agreement whose object was to 
obstruct justice, that the defendant knowingly joined it, and that at 
least 
one overt act was committed in furtherance of the object of the 
agreement." United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 243 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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before closing arguments. Neither counsel objected to the 
charge the court subsequently gave. The district court's 
charge included an instruction on the statute of limitations 
and the overt acts. However, the court did not inform the 
jury that it must agree that the defendant committed at 
least one act within five years of the date of the indictment 
in order to convict under Count II.4 The court instructed 
the jury, in part, as follows: 
 
       The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
       that at least one overt act was committed by a member 
       of the conspiracy. You must unanimously agree that 
       the same overt act was committed. I will emphasize 
       this point, before you can conclude that Mr. Jake is 
       guilty of conspiracy you must unanimously agree that 
       the same overt act was committed. It is not sufficient 
       for five jurors to believe overt act #1 was committed 
       and 7 jurors to believe overt act # 2 was committed. All 
       of you must agree and be convinced beyond a 
       reasonable doubt that the same overt act was 
       committed. 
 
App. at 20-21. 
 
Even though defense counsel did not object to that 
charge during the charge conference, he asked to see the 
court at sidebar after the court finished its instructions and 
the prosecution finished its principal closing argument. 
There, the following exchange occurred: 
 
       THE COURT: Now, what did you want to put on the 
       record, Mr. Gardner? 
 
       MR. GARDNER [defense counsel]: Your honor, with 
       regard to count two, the conspiracy to obstruct a 
       criminal investigation by means of bribery. 
 
       THE COURT: Yes. 
 
       MR. GARDNER: With regard to the first six alleged 
       overt acts, those acts occurred on or before 
       September 23, 1992. And, Your Honor, the 
       indictment is dated January 28, 1999. So it's clear 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. There is no statute of limitations for murder as charged in Count I. 18 
U.S.C. S 3281. 
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       that those six alleged overt acts occurred outside the 
       five year statute. 
 
       * * * 
 
       MR. GARDNER: Your Honor, those six alleged overt 
       acts occurred outside of the five year statute of 
       limitations so it occurred to me that they would not 
       be proper for consideration by the jury. I would ask 
       that the jury be so instructed. 
 
       THE COURT: [to the prosecutor] What's your view? 
 
       MR. HOUSER [the prosecutor]: My view is that's simply 
       not the law. As long as there's one overt act 
       committed within the statute of limitations it's 
       entirely appropriate for the others to be considered 
       as well. 
 
       THE COURT: Yeah. Well, that's my understanding, so 
       we'll deny the motion. If you're right we'll probably 
       have to retry it. 
 
App. at 1476-2 to 1477-3 (emphasis added). Following the 
completion of argument, the jury retired to deliberate and 
thereafter returned a verdict of not guilty as to the murder 
charged in Count I, but guilty of the conspiracy to obstruct 
a criminal investigation under Count II. 
 
Thereafter, Jake filed a motion for a new trial based upon 
the district court's failure to inform the jury that it could 
not convict on Count II unless all jurors were convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Jake committed at least 
one overt act within five years of the date of the indictment. 
The district court agreed, and granted Jake's motion for a 
new trial. The court held that defense counsel had put the 
court on notice of the defect in the jury instructions during 
the sidebar colloquy we have set forth above. Accordingly, 
the court held that the objection was preserved, and that 
the failure to give the requested charge constituted 
reversible error. 
 
This appeal followed.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We review a district court's grant of a new trial for abuse of 
discretion. 
United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 237 (3d Cir. 2001). "By definition, 
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II. 
 
The government argues that (1) Jake failed to object to 
the charge, and thereby waived any problem under the 
statute of limitations; (2) even if the statute of limitations 
was not waived, Jake nonetheless failed to preserve an 
objection to the court's charge and; (3) any error the court 
may have committed in initially refusing to give the 
requested charge was harmless. 
 
It is well settled that a criminal defendant is entitled to 
an instruction on the applicable statute of limitations. See 
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-397 (1957). 
See also United States v. Schurr, 794 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 
1986). Accordingly, the trial court should have informed the 
jury of the need to prove at least one overt act within five 
years of the date of the indictment, just as defense counsel 
argued in his motion for a new trial. See Grunewald, 353 
U.S. at 396-97; Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 
(1946) ("The statute of limitations, unless suspended, runs 
from the last overt act during the existence of the 
conspiracy."). However, the statute of limitations is an 
affirmative defense that is waived unless properly 
preserved. United States v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 92-93 (3d 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 907 (1987). See also 
United States v. Oliva, 46 F.3d 320, 325 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(citing Karlin, 785 F.2d at 90-93) (where the defendant 
neither raised the statute of limitations as a defense before 
or at trial nor asked for any jury instructions on the 
defense, the defense is waived and this court is prevented 
from reaching the issue on direct review). 
 
Here, the district court concluded that defense counsel's 
comments at sidebar were sufficient to preserve the issue of 
the statute of limitations and the need to inform the jury 
that the government must establish beyond a reasonable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
a district court `abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.' " 
United States v. Askari, 140 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)), vacated on 
other grounds, 159 F.3d 774 (3d Cir. 1998). Consequently, " `[t]he abuse 
of discretion standard includes review to determine that the discretion 
was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.' " Id. 
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doubt that Jake committed at least one overt act within five 
years of the date of the indictment. We disagree. 
 
We believe that the only practical interpretation of the 
aforementioned sidebar exchange between defense counsel 
and the court is the one given it at the time by both the 
court and the prosecutor. When the conversation occurred, 
the district court and the prosecutor clearly thought that 
defense counsel was only asking the court to limit the 
evidence the jury could consider to those overt acts 
occurring within five years of the indictment. That is what 
defense counsel said, and that is what the court and 
prosecutor heard. This is evident not only from a common 
sense interpretation of counsel's statement, but also from 
the responses of the court and prosecutor. When asked to 
respond, the prosecutor replied that the jury could consider 
all of the alleged overt acts "[a]s long as there's one overt 
act committed within the statute of limitations . . . ." The 
court agreed, and rejected defense counsel's request.6 
Defense counsel did not attempt to clarify the interpretation 
that was evident from the prosecutor's reply, nor did he 
object to the charge that the court gave. Defense counsel 
now attempts to parlay the sidebar colloquy into an 
objection that he could have raised at sidebar, but didn't. 
 
The district court nevertheless relied upon counsel's 
remarks at sidebar in granting a new trial based upon the 
failure to charge on the application of the statute of 
limitations to the overt acts of a conspiracy. However, our 
review of the record causes us to conclude that defense 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The prosecutor and court were correct. A conspiracy is a continuing 
offense and a jury may consider each and all of a defendant's actions in 
furtherance of the conspiracy so long as the indictment is brought within 
five years of the last overt act. See United States v. Johnson, 165 F.2d 
42, 45 (3d Cir. 1947) (overt acts committed outside the statute of 
limitations period for a conspiracy to obstruct justice may be proved to 
show the existence and continuance of the conspiracy so long as at least 
one overt act is within the statute of limitations period). See also 
Gruenwald, 353 U.S. at 396-97; Schurr, 794 F.2d at 907. Thus, the 
district court correctly rejected defense counsel's attempt to limit the 
jury's consideration to only those overt acts occurring within five years 
of the indictment. 
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counsel simply did not request the statute of limitations 
instruction that the new trial was predicated upon. 
 
Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides, in relevant part, that 
 
       No party may assign as error any portion of the charge 
       or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto 
       before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
       distinctly the matter to which that party objects and 
       the grounds of the objection. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. "The purpose of this provision is to 
provide the district court an opportunity to correct potential 
problems in jury instructions before the jury begins its 
deliberations." United States v. Russell, 134 F.3d 171, 178 
(3d Cir. 1998). See also United States v. Logan , 717 F.2d 
84, 91 n.13 (3d Cir. 1983) ("Rule 30 has the manifest 
purpose of avoiding whenever possible the necessity of a 
time-consuming new trial by providing the trial judge with 
an opportunity to correct any mistakes in the charge before 
the jury begins to deliberate.") 
 
We have recognized that "the crux of Rule 30 is that the 
district court be given notice of potential errors in the jury 
instructions, not that a party be `required to adhere to any 
formalities of language and style to preserve his objection 
on the record.' " Russell, 134 F.3d at 178 (quoting United 
States v. O'Neill, 116 F.3d 245, 247 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
However, an objection must nevertheless be sufficiently 
precise to allow the trial court to address the concerns 
raised in the objection. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. Thus, 
counsel must "stat[e] distinctly the matter to which that 
party objects and the grounds of the objection." Russell, 
134 F.3d at 179 (citing United States v. Sandini , 803 F.2d 
123 (3d Cir. 1986)). "[C]ounsel is required to draw the 
court's attention to a specific instruction, or to a problem 
with an instruction, in order to put the court on notice so 
that a possible error may be corrected before the jury 
begins to deliberate." Davis, 183 F.3d at 252 (discussing 
requests for jury instructions generally). "Without a clearly 
articulate objection, a trial court is not sufficiently apprized 
of the contested issue and the need to cure a potential error 
to avoid a new trial." Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 631 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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In Knight, a case we find instructive, defense counsel 
requested an involuntary manslaughter charge be included 
in the court's instructions on homicide. The court agreed. 
However, defense counsel withdrew that request when the 
court agreed to also inform the jury that assault with a 
deadly weapon was a felony as the prosecutor requested. 
Confronted with that additional instruction as to 
possession of a deadly weapon, defense counsel withdrew 
his request for an involuntary manslaughter charge. The 
court afforded both attorneys an opportunity to object to 
the proposed charge before giving it, but defense counsel 
did not object when the court instructed the jury without 
including an instruction on manslaughter. The defendant 
was convicted, and appealed. 
 
On appeal, defense counsel argued that he requested 
that the court not give a manslaughter charge "in 
conjunction with the proposed explanation of a felony." Id. 
at 631. Counsel insisted that his original objection to the 
complete omission of the charge informed the court that he 
wanted a manslaughter charge without the explanatory 
instruction regarding possession of a deadly weapon. Id. We 
disagreed. We concluded that defense counsel had not 
objected with the specificity required under Rule 30 to 
preserve an objection. 
 
       Defense counsel . . . did not make known that he 
       maintained an objection to the failure to give the 
       charge in the form advocated. Moreover, when the 
       court asked if either party had any objections to the 
       jury instructions in their final form, defense counsel 
       was silent. 
 
Id. 
 
Moreover, in Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 387 
(1999), the Supreme Court said: 
 
       a request for an instruction before the jury retires[does 
       not] preserve an objection to the instruction actually 
       given by the court. Otherwise district judges would 
       have to speculate on what sorts of objections might be 
       implied through a request for an instruction and issue 
       rulings on "implied" objections that a defendant never 
       intends to raise. 
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Jake's attempt to wedge his sidebar comments into the 
parameters of Rule 30 requires just such speculation. The 
fact that the district court ultimately concluded that Jake's 
remarks were sufficient to put it on notice of the 
requirement for an instruction on the overt act occurring 
within the statute of limitations does not change that. 
Defense counsel's request for an additional charge does not 
constitute an objection to the charge that was given. See 
also United States v. Sandini, 803 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
In Sandini, defense counsel failed to preserve an 
objection under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) merely by objecting on 
grounds of "relevance" at three different times during the 
trial. 803 F.2d at 126. We found that counsel's failure to 
object under Rule 404(b) was not preserved because 
counsel did not rest his objection upon that rule. Id. 
 
Here, the district court cited our opinion in Russell in 
concluding that the objection was preserved, and granting 
a new trial. There, we found that the colloquy between the 
judge and trial court put the court on notice of a possible 
error in the jury instructions. The trial court did not 
instruct the jury as to the need for unanimity on predicate 
offenses in a continuing criminal enterprise pursuant to 21 
U.S.C. S 848 as required by United States v. Edmunds, 80 
F.3d 810, 814 (3d Cir. 1996). Following the charge, the 
judge met with counsel to allow them an opportunity to 
voice any objections to the court's instructions. During the 
ensuing conference, the prosecutor and defense counsel 
engaged in an extended debate over the applicability of 
Edmunds. Although defense counsel did not explicitly 
object to the instructions, he nonetheless informed the 
court that he did not think that Edmunds was applicable, 
and proposed an alternate jury instruction. Russell, 134 
F.3d at 178-180. On those facts, we held that the colloquy 
was "tantamount to an objection and therefore sufficient to 
preserve this issue" for review. Id. at 180. 
 
Although counsel's statements in Russell did not focus 
on a specific objection to the trial judge's charge, they did 
illuminate the debate over the unanimity rule we had 
interpreted in Edmunds. Moreover, counsel's alternative 
instruction afforded a clear opportunity for the trial court to 
respond to the problem that counsel had identified. Unlike 
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Russell, the colloquy here did not focus on the legal issue 
in question. Rather, it not only focused upon an entirely 
distinct issue, it also rested upon an erroneous view of the 
law. 
 
For these reasons, we find that Jake failed to preserve an 
objection to the absence of a statute of limitations  
instruction.7 Accordingly, we review Jake's objection only 
for plain error. See Jones, 527 U.S. at 388; Russell, 134 
F.3d at 178. "For there to be plain error, there must be an 
`error' that is `plain' and that `affects substantial rights'. A 
deviation from a `legal rule is `error'. 
 
A `plain' error is one which is `clear' or`obvious.' " Russell, 
135 F.3d at 180 (internal citations omitted). In plain error 
cases, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion that a 
plain error has occurred. United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 
725, 734 (1993). 
 
III. 
 
An appellate court may correct a plain error only if that 
error "affects substantial rights." Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
"[I]n most cases it means that the error must have been 
prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Jake's counsel also contends that if the statute of limitations defense 
was actually waived, he was ineffective in preserving the issue for 
review. 
He therefore urges us to remand for a hearing on that issue. However, 
we have stated repeatedly that Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel should ordinarily be raised in a collateral 
proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255 rather than on direct appeal. 
Oliva, 46 F.3d at 325; Sandini, 888 F.2d at 312; Government of the Virgin 
Islands v. Forte, 806 F.2d 73, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 950 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986). 
We have noted an exception to this practice where the Sixth Amendment 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is predicated on an actual 
showing of conflict of interest between the attorney and the accused as 
apparent from the face of the record. See Government of the Virgin 
Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 133-134 (3d Cir. 1989). However, nothing 
in the record or argument of Jake's counsel indicates a readily apparent 
conflict of interest between Jake and his counsel or any other 
extraordinary circumstances which would mandate a hearing on the 
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we reject Jake's 
request for an evidentiary hearing during the course of his direct appeal. 
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court proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. However, Jake 
clearly cannot satisfy that burden because he concedes that 
an overt act did occur within five years of the date of the 
indictment. That evidence was not only uncontradicted, it 
was furnished by Jake himself. 
 
The district court believed that Jake was prejudiced by 
the omission of the charge because the jury "may have 
utilized an overt act outside the statute of limitations to 
find Jake guilty of Count II [the conspiracy count] of the 
indictment." App. at 26.8 However, Jake testified about his 
conversation with Echols, and admitted that he attempted 
to get her to lie to the grand jury. The jury heard a 
recording of that conversation, and there is nothing to 
suggest that the conversation did not occur on October 2, 
1997 as charged in overt act #6 in the indictment. 9 
 
Accordingly, Jake admitted to instructing Echols to 
perjure herself in front of the grand jury within five years of 
the indictment. Therefore, notwithstanding any alleged 
error, the absence of a specific instruction on an overt act 
occurring within five years of the indictment could not have 
prejudiced Jake. It was never an issue, and Jake's own 
testimony removed all doubt. Therefore, Jake's contention 
of error must fail. See Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 
(1999) (failure to charge on an element of a crime was not 
prejudicial where uncontroverted evidence established an 
element of the offense and no reasonable jury could have 
concluded that the element had not been established 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order 
granting a new trial, reinstate the conviction under Count 
II, and remand to the district court for sentencing. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The district court briefly discussed "prejudice" as part of its 
harmless 
error analysis. 
 
9. There is no challenge to the chain of custody of the tape recordings or 
any of the logs or records that may have been relied upon to furnish the 
date of the conversation. 
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